In this paper, we study the approximate controllability for the stochastic heat equation over measurable sets, and the optimal actuator location of the minimum norm controls. We formulate a relaxed optimization problem for both actuator location and its corresponding minimum norm control into a two-person zero sum game problem and develop a sufficient and necessary condition for the optimal solution via Nash equilibrium. At last, we prove that the relaxed optimal solution is an optimal actuator location for the classical problem.
Introduction
Let F = (Ω, F, {F t } t≥0 , P) be a stochastic basis with usual conditions. On F, we define a standard scalar Wiener process W = {w(t)} t≥0 . For simplicity, we assume that the filtration {F t } t≥0 is generated by W .
Fix T > 0. Given a Hilbert space H, we denote by L 2 F (0, T ; H) the Banach space consisting of all Hvalued {F t } t≥0 -adapted processes X such that the square of the canonical norm E X(·) 2 L 2 (0,T ;H) < ∞; denote by L ∞ F (0, T ; H) the Banach space consisting of all H-valued {F t } t≥0 -adapted bounded processes, with the essential supremum norm; and denote by L 2 F (Ω; C([0, T ]; H)) the Banach space consisting of all H-valued {F t } t≥0 -adapted continuous processes X such that the square of the canonical norm E X(·) 2 C(0,T ;H) < ∞. For any t ∈ [0, T ], the space L 2 (Ω, F t , P; H) consists of all H-valued F t -measurable random variables with finite second moments.
Let D be a bounded domain in R d with a C 2 boundary ∂D. Let G be measurable subset with positive measures of D.
We denote by (·, ·) the inner product in L 2 (D), and denote by · the norm induced by (·, ·). We also use the notations (·, ·) G and · G for the inner product and the norm defined on L 2 (G), respectively. We denote by | · | the Lebesgue measure on R d . Consider the following stochastic heat equation dy = Ay dt + χ G u(t) dt + a(t)y dw(t), t ∈ (0, T ),
where a ∈ L ∞ F (0, T ; R). We say the system (1.1) is approximately controllable at time T , if for any initial data y 0 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F 0 , P; L 2 ((D)), and any final state y 1 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , P; L 2 (D)) and any ε > 0, there exists a control u in the space L 2 F (0, T ; L 2 (D)) such that the solution y of the system (1.1) with initial data y 0 and control u satisfies E y(T ) − y 1 2 ≤ ε.
Without of generality, we simply choose y 1 = 0. In the sequel, fix ε > 0. Our first result is to confirm the approximate controllability for system (1.1). Moreover, we solve the following minimum norm control problem
where y(·; G, u) is the solution of system (1.1). In the problem (1.2), we say u is an admissible
) and E y(T ; G, u) 2 ≤ ε; we say u * is a minimal norm control if u * is an admissible control such that N ε (G) is achieved.
To present our result, let us introduce the following backward stochastic heat equation
, it is known (see, for example [10, 6] ) that the equation (1.3) admits a unique solution (z, Z) in the space of (L 2
is approximately controllable at time T . Moreover, denote by η * the minimizer of the functional defined in (1.4), u * = z(·; η * ) ↾ G is a minimal norm control and
where z(·; η) is the solution of equation (1.3) with z(T ) = η * .
Controllability problems of deterministic partial differential equations are extensive studied in literature; see the survey articles [20, 21] and references therein. Recently, there are also some results obtained for the stochastic counterpart [4, 7, 11, 12] , to name a few. In particular, authors in [12] pointed out a different observation from the deterministic equations that null controllability does not necessarily imply approximate controllability in the stochastic system, and showed the later by duality argument and a Riesz-type representation theorem for general stochastic processes [13] . Unlike the method employed in [12] , we use a variational technique and provide a constructive proof of approximate controllability, and furthermore, our method leads to the existence of the minimal norm control.
Thanks to the observability inequality developed in [19] (see [16, 2] for the deterministic version), our approximate controllability result is more robust and can allow the control domain G to be any measurable set with positive Lebesgue measure, compared to works mentioned earlier with the internal control living on an open set. This generalization facilitates the study of the optimal actuator location problem for a wider class of equations. For example, authors in [8] investigate the optimal actuator location of the minimum norm controls for deterministic heat equations in arbitrary dimensions, while [1] studied the one dimensional case and [9] considered a special class of controlled domains. For other actuator location problems, see [5, 17] , and related numerical research [14, 15, 18] .
The second part of our paper is devoted to the optimal actuator location of the minimum norm control problem for internal approximate controllable stochastic heat equations.
Given α ∈ (0, 1), let 5) where | · | is the Lebesgue measure on R d . A classical optimal actuator location of the minimal norm control problem is to seek a set
If such a G * exists, we say that G * is an optimal actuator location of the minimum norm controls. Any minimum norm control u * satisfying
is called a minimum norm control with respect to the optimal actuator location G * . The existence of the optimal actuator location G * is generally not guaranteed because of the absence of the compactness of W. For this reason, we extend the feasible set W to a relaxed set B (see (3.1)), and solve a relaxed optimal actuator location problem. We prove the existence of the relaxed optimal actuator location and characterize the solution of the relaxed problem via a Nash equilibrium; see Section 3 for problem formulation and details.
The key contribution of this paper is that we are able to recover the solution from a relaxed problem to a solution of the classical optimal actuator location problem. Theorem 1.2. There exists a solution to problem (1.6).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result on the existence of optimal actuator location problem in a stochastic system, and it can easily be applied to the null controllability of stochastic heat equations discussed in [19] . In a related work [17] , authors studied a deterministic heat equation with random initial data, and minimized the constant in the observability inequality, instead of the norm of admissible controls.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show the existence of the minimizer of J ε and construct the minimum norm control to prove Theorem 1.1. In Section 3, we solve a relaxed optimal actuator location problem and provide a sufficient and necessary condition for the relaxed optimal solution via Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we show the existence of the a classical optimal actuator location problem.
Characterization of the minimum norm control
In this section, we study the approximate controllability of the system (1.1). We provide a constructive proof of the existence of an admissible control, and then show that this control is indeed a minimum norm control that solves problem (1.2).
First, we prove the existence of the minimizer of J ε defined in (1.4).
Proof. We first show that J ε (·) is convex. To this end, fix θ ∈ (0, 1) and let
By linearity, we have
Thus,
On the other hand,
Therefore, we obtain
and so J ε (·) is convex. Next, we prove that the functional
Note that
which implies the coercivity of J ε . If lim inf n→∞ T 0 E z(t; η n ) 2 G dt = 0, then it follows from the observability inequality in [19,
Moreover, by lower semi-continuity we obtain
Then by the observability inequality again, we get z(0; η) = 0, and thus lim inf
which implies (2.1), and so J ε is coercive.
To sum up, we showed that J ε is convex, continuous, and coercive, and thus the minimizer of J ε exists.. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.1, and characterize the minimum norm control via the minimizer η * of J ε obtained in Lemma 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Since J ε attains its minimum value at η * , for any η ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , P; L 2 (D)) and h ∈ R we have
Also note that
then we obtain
If h > 0, then dividing h and sending h → 0+ yield
If h < 0, then diving h and sending h → 0− yield
Now applying Itô's formula to (y, z) yields
After we rewrite it in the integral form and take the expectation on both sides, we get
Plugging (2.5) into (2.4) and letting u = u * = z(·; η * ) ↾ G , we obtain
Since η is an arbitrary element in L 2 (Ω, F T , P; L 2 (D)), we conclude that
Therefore, u * = z(·; η * ) ↾ G is an admissible control. Next, we show that u * is indeed the minimum norm control. To this end, let's go back to the inequality (2.2). Note that
If h > 0, then dividing h and sending
To sum up, we have the following Euler-Lagrange equation
Plugging (2.5) into (2.6) and using u * = z(·; η * ) ↾ G , we get
If particular, by choosing η = η * ,
Suppose now there is another admissible control u such that
Then we have by (2.7)
Using (2.5) again, we arrive at
and by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
which implies the optimality of u * . To show the boundedness for u * , let's replace η in (2.6), and then
By the observability inequality (see [19, Lemma 3.2] ) for the (relaxed) system (3.2) that
for some C > 0, independent of β, and thus
Using (2.8) again, we have
Therefore,
which completes the proof.
A relaxed optimal actuator location problem
Without the compactness of W defined in (1.5), it seems very difficult to solve the classical optimal actuator location problem directly. Instead, we study a relaxed problem and provide a solution in the framework of a two-person zero sum game via Nash equilibrium. To this end, define
Note that the set B is a relaxation of the set {χ G | G ∈ W}.
For any β ∈ B, consider the following equation
We denote by y(·; β, u) the solution of equation (3.2), and say the system (3.2) approximately controllable at time T if for any
and the classical optimal actuator location problem (1.6) is changed into the following relaxed problem
Any solution β * to the problem (3.4) is called a relaxed optimal actuator location of the minimal norm controls.
Theorem 3.1. There exists at least one solution of the problem (3.4). In addition, β * is a relaxed optimal actuator location of the minimal norm controls if and only if there exists η * ∈ U M such that the pair (β * , η * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the following two-person zero-sum game problem: to find (β * , η * ) ∈ B × U M such that
To prove this theorem, we first study a variational problem
where
, and there exists a positive constant C, independent of β such that
(2) The control defined by u * = βz(·; η * ) (3.8)
is the minimal norm control to the problem (3.3), where z(·; η * ) is the solution of the adjoint system (1.3) with z(T ) = η * . Moreover,
Proof. In the same spirit of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 1.1, the existence of η * and optimality of u * can be similarly verified. Moreover, we can also obtain the following Euler-Lagrange equation
It follows from the observability inequality (see [19, Lemma 3.2] ) for the (relaxed) system (3.2) that
Consequently,
Using (3.11) again, we have
or equivalently, 12) or equivalently
On the other hand, we have by (3.12)
which concludes the proof.
Remark 3.3. It follows from (3.7) that we can restrict our search of the minimizer of J ε (·; β) within a closed ball of L 2 (Ω, F T , P; L 2 (D)), and we denote it by U M for some M > 0. Now let's formulate an equivalent problem to (3.4), which is a two-person zero sum game. Define
It is clear that β 2 ∈ Θ for any β ∈ B, and θ 1/2 ∈ B for all θ ∈ Θ. (3.14)
We also define a functional f :
Then it follows from the relation (3.9) that
Therefore, seeking a minimizer β * ∈ B for N (β) amounts to finding a minimizer θ * for sup η∈U M f (θ, η).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. In the following, we will solve both the problems
at the same time.
(1) Let us equip L ∞ (D) with the weak * topology. Then Θ is compact and convex in L ∞ (D).
(2) Since U M is a closed ball, it is weak compact and convex in L 2 (Ω, F T , P; L 2 (D)). We claim that θ * (x) = 1 for x ∈ {H > c(α)} a.e. θ * (x) = 0 for x ∈ {H < c(α)} a.e. By the similar argument, we also get the (strict) inequality (4.5), and thus a contradiction. To sum up, if β * is a relaxed optimal actuator location, then
where E ⊆ {H = c(α)} and |E| = α|D| − |{H > c(α)}|. Therefore, by Theorem 3.1 we find an optimal actuator location β * to our classical problem (1.6), and thus we finished the proof of Theorem 1.2.
